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Abstract
In an open networking environment, a workstation usually needs to identify its legal users for providing its services. Kerberos
provides an efficient approach whereby a trusted third-party authentication server is used to verify users’ identities. However,
Kerberos enforces the user to use strong cryptographic secret for user authentication, and hence is insecure from password guessing
attacks if the user uses a weak password for convenience. In this paper, we focus on such an environment in which the users can use
easy-to-remember passwords. In addition to password guessing attacks, perfect forward secrecy (PFS in short) is another important
security consideration when designing an authentication and key distribution protocol. Based on the capability of protecting the
client’s password, the application server’s secret key, and the authentication server’s private key, we define seven classes of perfect
forward secrecy and focus on protocols achieving class-1, class-3, and class-7 due to their hierarchical relations. Then, we propose
three secure authentication and key distribution protocols to provide perfect forward secrecy of these three classes. All these
protocols are efficient in protecting poorly-chosen passwords chosen by users from guessing attacks and replay attacks.
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In today’s distributed computing environment, secure communication in insecure communication channels is a
very important issue. For this reason, user authentication and secret key distribution become the most important
security service for communication networks. Therefore, authentication and key distribution protocols are necessary
in distributed environments.
Password-based mechanism has been the most widely used method for user authentication since it allows people
to choose and remember their own passwords without any assistant device. However, human users usually choose
easy-to-remember passwords so that they are vulnerable to password guessing attacks. On the contrary, the entities
excluding human users, such as servers, can directly use strong cryptographic secrets for entity authentication and
hence prevent password guessing attacks.
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many communication systems. Diffie and Hellman [18] described how to establish a common session key by public
messages. Needham and Schroeder [19] proposed a point protocol that uses encryption to achieve authentication. In
1992, Bellovin and Merritt [1] presented a new protocol known as Encrypted Key Exchange, or EKE in short. It is the
landmark of 2-party authentication and key exchange protocols [1–7]. EKE can resist guessing attacks by giving the
attacker insufficient information to verify a guessed password. EKE performs a key exchange as well, so both parties
can encrypt their transmissions once authentication is established.
On the other hand, Gong, Lomas, Needham, and Saltzer [8] proposed a protocol, called GLNS protocol, in a
three-party setting in which two users (clients) establish a session key through an authentication server. Timestamps
are used in the protocol to guarantee message freshness. By using nonces and confounders, the protocol is successful
in generating a large search space to resist off-line password guessing attacks. Later, Gong proposed an optimal ver-
sion [9] of the GLNS protocol, which reduces the amount of message transmissions and does not require timestamps.
Keung and Siu [10] proposed another protocol that is immune to replay attacks and off-line password guessing attacks.
Kwon, Kang and Song [11] also proposed another protocol for mutual authentication and key distribution. In these
two protocols, the concept of one-time pad and one-way hash function is applied to reduce the computation cost.
Up to now, most of the literature on three-party authentication and key distribution protocols [7–16] have focused
on the environment in which two users (clients) establish a session key through an authentication server (client–client–
server model). However, let us consider an open distributed environment in which users at workstations wish to access
services on servers distributed throughout the network. In this setting, we have a centralized server (authentication
server) for granting permission to user (client) to access some services in other servers (application server). This
model consists of two servers with a client. To distinguish this with the existing model, we call this a client–server–
server model. In this environment, a workstation cannot be trusted to identify its users correctly to network services.
In particular, the following three threats exist:
• A user may gain access to a particular workstation and pretend to be another user operating from that workstation.
• A user may alter the network address of a workstation so that the requests sent from the altered workstation appear
to come from the impersonated workstation.
• A user may eavesdrop on exchanges and use a replay attack to gain entrance to a server or to disrupt operations.
In any of these cases, an unauthorized user may be able to gain access to services and data that he or she is not
authorized to access. Rather than building in elaborate authentication protocols at each server, a centralized authenti-
cation server is provided to authenticate users to servers and servers to users. Such an environment is suitable for many
applications. A typical example used in such a setting is the well-known protocol, Kerberos [17]. However, Kerberos
enforces the user to use a strong cryptographic secret for user authentication, and hence is insecure from password
guessing attacks if the user uses a weak password. In this paper, we focus on such an environment in which the users
use easy-to-remember passwords. In addition to password guessing attacks, perfect forward secrecy (PFS in short) is
another important security consideration when designing an authentication and key distribution protocol. Based on the
capability of protecting client’s password, the application server’s secret key, and the authentication server’s private
key, we define seven classes of perfect forward secrecy. Among them, we are interested in class-1, class-3, and class-7
PFS because they dominate the security from low level to high level. We also propose three protocols that can fit this
environment, resist various attacks, and separately achieve these three classes of PFS.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the description of notations and security
requirements. In Section 3, a protocol for class-1 PFS is proposed. We present a protocol for class-3 PFS in Section 4.
In Section 5, a protocol for class-7 PFS is suggested. In Section 6, we compare these three newly proposed protocols
with some well-known protocols. Finally we conclude this paper in Section 7.
2. Notations and security requirements
2.1. Notations
The notations in Table 1 are used throughout this paper.
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Notations
A Client (user)
B Application server
S Authentication server
PA Password shared between A and S
SB Secret key shared between B and S
KS Public key of the authentication server
x, y, ra, rb, a, b, rb′ Random numbers
h( ) One-way hash function
A → B : M A sends a message M to B
g Base generator
P Large prime (P is the modulus of all modular exponentiations)
[info]K Symmetric encryption of “info” with key K
{info}K Asymmetric encryption of “info” with public key K
2.2. Security requirements
In this paper, we consider some well-known attacks including password guessing attacks and replay attacks, and
define seven classes of perfect forward secrecy.
• Password guessing attacks:
Password guessing attacks can be classified into two types:
(1) On-line password guessing attacks: An attacker tries to use a guessed password to pass the verification of the
authentication server in an on-line manner. Generally, the authentication server can detect such an attack by
noticing continuous authentication failures.
(2) Off-line password guessing attacks: An attacker eavesdrops communication messages during a protocol and
stores them locally. Then he/she tries to find out the weak password by repeatedly guessing a possible pass-
word and verifying the correctness of the guess via the captured information in an off-line manner. In general,
such an attack can be prevented only by carefully designing the protocol such that no verifiable information
can be used by the attack to verify the correctness of one guess on password.
• Replay attacks:
In this attack, an adversary tries to replay messages partially or completely obtained in previous communications.
If he can impersonate other users or expose other secret that is sensitive and useful for further deceptions, by
guessing attacks, known-plaintext attacks or other cryptographic analysis methods, then the protocol is said to be
vulnerable to replay attacks.
• Perfect forward secrecy (PFS):
In a two-party setting, a password-based protocol is called perfect forward secure [5,8,16] if the revealing of
the password to an attacker does not help him obtain the session keys of past sessions. Here we classify perfect
forward secrecy in a three-party setting according to the cases of the combinations whether the client’s password,
the application server’s secret key, and the authentication server’s private key are revealed. Based on the capability
of protecting the client’s password, the application server’s secret key, and the authentication server’s private key,
we define seven classes of perfect forward secrecy. In Table 2, we show these seven classes of perfect forward
secrecy. For example, a protocol providing class-1 PFS means that an adversary cannot extract the past session
keys from previous communications despite the reveal of real password, as long as the application server’s secret
key and the authentication server’s private key are still kept secret.
Note that the risk of revealing the client’s password is much higher than that of revealing the application server’s
secret key, and the risk of revealing the application server’s secret key is much higher than that of revealing the
authentication server’s private key. Due to their hierarchical relations among class-1 PFS, class-3 PFS, and class-7
PFS, we are interested in designing protocols satisfying these three classes. The detailed definitions for class-1 PFS,
class-3 PFS, and class-7 PFS are in the following.
H.-M. Sun, H.-T. Yeh / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 72 (2006) 1002–1011 1005Table 2
Seven classes of perfect forward secrecy
Client’s password Application server’s
secret key
Authentication server’s
private key
Class-1 PFS Revealed Secure Secure
Class-2 PFS Secure Revealed Secure
Class-3 PFS Revealed Revealed Secure
Class-4 PFS Secure Secure Revealed
Class-5 PFS Revealed Secure Revealed
Class-6 PFS Secure Revealed Revealed
Class-7 PFS Revealed Revealed Revealed
• Class-1 PFS (PFS with low security):
A protocol providing class-1 PFS means that if the client’s password is revealed to an attacker, but the application
server’s secret key and the authentication server’s private key are still secure, it does not help the attacker obtain
the session keys of previous sessions.
• Class-3 PFS (PFS with medium security):
A protocol providing class-3 PFS means that if the client’s password and the application server’s secret key are
simultaneously revealed to an attacker, but the authentication server’s private key is still secure, it does not help
the attacker obtain the session keys of previous sessions.
• Class-7 PFS (PFS with high security):
A protocol providing class-7 PFS means that if the client’s password, the application server’s secret key, and the
authentication server’s private key are simultaneously revealed to an attacker, it still does not help the attacker
obtain the session keys of previous sessions.
3. A protocol providing PFS with low security
An efficient authentication and key distribution protocol providing class-1 PFS is proposed in this section. There
are three principals involved in our protocol: an application server B who provides services to clients, a client A who
requests services from the application server, and an authentication server S who is responsible for authentication and
who distributes the common session key shared between the client A and the application server B .
3.1. The proposed protocol
In this protocol, we assume that all principals know the server’s public key KS in the system. We also assume that a
poorly chosen password PA chosen by A is known to S via a secure channel. Similarly, the application server’s secret
key SB is known to S via a secure channel.
We show our protocol in Fig. 1 and the detailed steps are described as follows:
(1) A → S: A, {A,B,PA, ra}KS :
A chooses a random number ra and keeps it secret. Then, A encrypts A,B,PA, ra with server S’s public key KS
and transmits the encrypted message as a request to S, where PA is the password of A.
A S B
A, {A,B,PA, ra}KS−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A, [A,B, [A,K]ra ,K]SB−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[A,K]ra , [B,rb]K←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
rb−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 1. A protocol providing PFS with low security.
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After receiving client A’s message, the authentication server, S, decrypts {A,B,PA, ra}KS with his private key
corresponding to the public key KS and checks the authenticity of A by verifying A’s password PA. Then, he
chooses a common key K . Hence, he can compute [A,B, [A,K]ra,K]SB , and transmit it to B . Note that the
value ra also acts as a one-time key.
(3) B → A: [A,K]ra, [B, rb]K :
The application server B first decrypts the message [A,B, [A,K]ra,K]SB with his secret key SB and gets the
common key K . Then B chooses a challenge value rb, encrypts B and rb with the common key K , and sends
[A,K]ra and [B, rb]K to the user A.
(4) A → B: rb:
In step 4, the user A decrypts message [A,K]ra with ra and gets the common key K . Then, he decrypts [B, rb]K ,
checks the validity of K , and sends the response value rb to B .
Finally, the user A and the application server B can authenticate each other and compute the common session key
h(K).
3.2. Security analysis
3.2.1. Guessing attacks
In this protocol, we protect the password from an attacker, who can be either malicious or merely incompetent. If
the attacker attempts to use a guessed password in an on-line transaction, a failed guess can be detected and logged.
So, our scheme is resistant to on-line guessing attack.
Considering an off-line guessing attack, A’s password is used only to authenticate A’s status in Message 1. It is
not included in any verifiable data. Thus, an attacker is impossible to verify his guess on the password unless he can
know the random number ra. Therefore, our protocol is immune to off-line password guessing attacks.
3.2.2. Replay attacks
Although an attacker can replay an old Message 1 because the server cannot decide its freshness, all the attacker can
get is {[A,B, [A,K]ra,K]SB , [A,K]ra, [B, rb]K }. Because he is unable to know the random numbers ra included in
Message 1 or server B’s secret key SB to decrypt these messages, this does not help him compromise a future session
key K ′ or to guess the password. Thus, our protocol is secure against message replay attacks.
3.2.3. Class-1 PFS
Here, we consider whether the proposed scheme provides class-1 PFS. When a user’s password is revealed, an
attacker can know PA. Because the attacker does not know the server S’s private key, he cannot decrypt Message 1
to get ra. Also, he cannot decrypt Message 2 because he does not know the server B’s secret key. So the attacker
does not have any opportunity to obtain K and get the session key h(K). Therefore, the session key is still secure.
Therefore, our scheme provides class-1 PFS.
4. Protocol providing PFS with medium security
In this section, we propose an efficient authentication and key distribution protocol providing class-3 PFS.
4.1. The proposed protocol
We show our protocol in Fig. 2 and the detailed steps are described as follows.
(1) A → B: A, {A,B,PA, ra}KS :
A chooses a random number ra and keeps it secret. Then, A encrypts A,B,PA, and ra with the server S’s public
key KS and transmits the encrypted message as a request to the server B , where PA is the password of A.
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A, {A,B,PA, ra}KS−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A, {A,B,PA, ra}KS ,
B, {B,A,SB , rb}KS←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
[A,K]ra , [B,K]rb−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[A,K]ra , [B, rb′]K←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
rb′−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 2. A protocol providing PFS with middle security.
(2) B → S: A, {A,B,PA, ra}KS ,B, {B,A,SB, rb}KS :
After receiving the client A’s message, the server B chooses a confounder rb, and encrypts B , A, SB , and rb with
the server S’s public key KS . Both ciphertexts {A,B,PA, ra}KS and {B,A,SB, rb}KS together with A and B are
sent to the server S.
(3) S → B: [A,K]ra, [B,K]rb:
After receiving Message 2, the authentication server S decrypts it with his private key, then checks the authenticity
of A by verifying A’s password PA and the authenticity of B by verifying B’s secret key SB . The server S then
chooses a common key K , computes {[A,K]ra, [B,K]rb}, and transmits it to B . Note that the values ra and rb
also act as one-time keys.
(4) B → A: [A,K]ra, [B, rb′]K :
The application server B first decrypts the message [B,K]rb with rb and gets the common key K . Then B
uses rb′ as a challenge value, encrypts B , rb′ with the common key K and sends [A,K]ra and [B, rb′]K to the
client A.
(5) A → B: rb′:
In step 5, the client A decrypts message [A,K]ra with ra and gets the common key K . Then, he decrypts
[B, rb′]K , checks the validity of K , and sends the response value rb′ to B .
After authentication procedure, the client A and the application server B negotiate a session key h(K) to com-
municate with each other securely.
4.2. Security analysis
4.2.1. Guessing attacks
In this protocol, the password guessing attacks cannot succeed because no poorly chosen password is used as
encryption key. So, our protocol is immune to password guessing attacks.
4.2.2. Replay attacks
Although the attacker can replay old Message 1 and Message 2, this does not help him compromise a future session
key K ′ from S’s reply because ra and rb are unknown to the attacker. Thus, our protocol is secure against message
replay attacks.
4.2.3. Class-3 PFS
Class-3 PFS is discussed in this section. We assume that the client A’s password PA and the server B’s secret key
SB are known by an attacker. Because the attacker does not know the server S’s secret key to decrypt Message 1 or
Message 2 in order to get ra or rb, the attacker does not have any opportunity to obtain K and get the session key
h(K). The session key is still secure. Therefore, our scheme provides class-3 PFS.
5. Protocol providing PFS with high security
5.1. The proposed protocol
In Fig. 3, the third authentication and key distribution protocol is provided to gratify Class-7 PFS.
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A, {A,B,PA, ra, gx }KS−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A, {A,B,PA, ra, gx }KS ,
B, {B,A,SB , rb, gy }KS←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
[A,ga ]ra , [A,B,K]KAS ,
[B,gb]rb, [B,A,K]KBS−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[A,ga ]ra ,[A,B,K]KAS , [B, rb′]K←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
rb′−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 3. A protocol providing PFS with high security.
The details are described as follows:
(1) A → B: A, {A,B,PA, ra, gx}KS :
A chooses a confounder ra, a random number x and computes gx . Then A encrypts A,B,PA, ra, gx by the
server S’s public key KS and sends the ciphertext to B , where PA is the password of A.
(2) B → S: A, {A,B,PA, ra, gx}KS ,B, {B,A,SB, rb, gy}KS :
After receiving the client A’s message, the server B chooses a confounder rb, and computes gy mod P by
choosing a random number y. Then, he encrypts B , A, SB , rb, gy with the server S’s public key KS . Both
ciphertexts {A,B,PA, ra, gx}KS and {B,A,SB, rb, gy}KS together with A and B are sent to the server S.
(3) S → B: [A,ga]ra, [A,B,K]KAS , [B,gb]rb, [B,A,K]KBS :
After receiving Message 2, the authentication server S decrypts it with his private key. S checks the authenticity
of A by verifying A’s password PA and the authenticity of B by verifying B’s secret key SB . He then chooses
a common key K , computes {[A,ga]ra, [A,B,K]KAS , [B,gb]rb, [B,A,K]KBS }, and transmits it to B , where a
and b are chosen by S, KAS = (gx)a = (ga)x = gxa and KBS = (gy)b = (gb)y = gyb are used to securely pass
the session key K . Note that the values ra and rb also act as one-time keys.
(4) B → A: [A,ga]ra, [A,B,K]KAS , [B, rb′]K :
The application server B first decrypts the message [B,gb]rb with rb and computes KBS = (gb)y = gyb . He then
decrypts [B,A,K]KBS with KBS and gets the common key K . Then, B uses rb′ as a challenge value, encrypts
B , rb′ with the common key K and sends [A,ga]ra, [A,B,K]KAS , [B, rb′]K to the client A.
(5) A → B: rb′:
The client A decrypts the message [A,ga]ra with ra and computes KAS = (ga)x = gxa . Then, he decrypts
[A,B,K]KAS with KAS and gets the common key K . After that, he decrypts [B, rb′]K , checks the validity of K ,
and sends the response value rb′ to B .
Finally, the client A and the application server B can authenticate each other and compute the common session
key h(K).
5.2. Security analysis
5.2.1. Guessing attacks
Instead of authenticating the status of A, the client’s password is not used in this protocol. This leads to that an
attacker has not any verifiable data to make sure whether his guess is right or wrong. So, our protocol is immune to
password guessing attacks.
5.2.2. Replay attacks
An attacker can replay old Message 1 and Message 2 because the server cannot decide its freshness. However, no
additional information can help him compromise a future session key or guess the password from S’s reply. Thus, our
protocol is secure against message replay attacks.
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Our protocol is based on the following well-known hard problem, which is believed infeasible to solve in polyno-
mial time.
Diffie–Hellman problem [18]: Given a prime P , a generator g, and two numbers gx mod P and gy mod P , find
gxy mod P .
We assume that the client A’s password PA, the application server B’s secret key SB , and the authentication server
S’s private key are all known by an attacker. Then the attacker can decrypt Message 2 to obtain ra, gx , rb, gy , and use
ra and rb to decrypt part of Message 3 to obtain ga , gb . But he cannot calculate KAS or KBS because the difficulty is
similar to solve the Diffie–Hellman problem [18]. So the attacker does not have any opportunity to obtain K and get
the session key h(K). Thus the session key is still secure. Therefore, our scheme provides class-7 PFS.
6. Efficiency and comparison
In this paper we focus on an environment with three parties (client–server–server model) that the user and the
application server authenticate each other via the authentication server. Because there is not any existing protocol
designed for this environment, one may employ some traditional three-party (client–client–server model) protocols
for this environment by putting one of the clients as the application server. Therefore, we compare some well-known
traditional three-party protocols including the optimal GLNS protocol [9], the improved K1P protocol [13], and the
extension of Otway–Rees protocol [12], with our three newly proposed protocols (low PFS protocol, medium PFS
protocol and high PFS protocol). We focus on several items such as the shared secret types, the number of steps,
the number of random numbers, the number of symmetric encryption operations, and the number of asymmetric
encryption operations. We ignore other comparisons like the total amount of data transferred because these items are
varying for different security levels. Table 3 shows the comparison results.
The extension of Otway–Rees protocol does not belong to any class of PFS. Compared with the optimal GLNS
protocol and the improved K1P protocol, our medium PFS protocol (class-3 PFS) has the least number of random num-
bers, the least number of symmetric encryption operations, and the same number of steps and asymmetric encryption
operations. The results show that our medium PFS protocol is the most efficient protocol among these class-3 PFS
protocols. In addition, our high PFS protocol can provide class-7 PFS while the others cannot.
We remark that by applying an existing three-party client–client–server protocol with class-3 PFS, e.g. [9] and
[13], to the client–server–server model with class-3 PFS, one may treat one of the clients as the application server.
Instead of using a password, a strong key (secret key) can be used in the application server. This seems to imply
that we do not need to design new protocols for the client–server–server model. However, there are three points for
us to promote new protocols for the client–server–server model. First, a client–client–server protocol is designed to
cope with password guessing attacks in both clients. Now, if one of the clients, that is the application server, can use
a strong key as its secret, one side of password guessing attacks can be always avoided. Thus we believe that the
cost of a client–server–server protocol can be less than that of a client–client–server protocol. This can be seen by
comparing our medium PFS protocol with the optimal GLNS protocol [9] and the improved K1P protocol [13] in
Table 3. Secondly, if one simply wants to use a client–server–server protocol with class-1 PFS, our low PFS protocol
can achieve. Although our medium PFS protocol, the optimal GLNS protocol [9], and the improved K1P protocol [13]
can also achieve class-1 PFS (this is because achieving class-3 PFS implies achieving class-1 PFS), these protocols are
not designed specifically for class-1 PFS and hence incur cost-inefficiency. Thirdly, most of the existing client–client–
server protocols achieve class-3 PFS. Therefore if we need a client–server–server protocol providing class-7 PFS, we
cannot apply those client–client–server protocols to the client–server–server model. Instead, we need design a new
protocol which meets the required security level. To sum up, as reflected from the comparison table, the tailor-made
protocols proposed in this paper have significant advantages over converting existing client–client–server protocols.
7. Conclusions
An open distributed environment in which the clients access services on application servers through an authentica-
tion server is discussed in this paper. Perfect forward secrecy is one of the most important considerations of designing
an authentication and key distribution protocol to fit this environment. Based on the capability of protecting the client’s
password, the application server’s secret key, and the authentication server’s private key, we define seven classes of
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Comparison of the well-known protocol
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
Optimal
GLNS [9]
Class 3
PFS
A: Password
B: Password
S: Private key
5 10
A: 2
B: 2
S: 2
A: 1
B: 1
S: 0
Improved
K1P [13]
Class 3
PFS
A: Password
B: Password
S: Private key
5 5
A: 1
B: 1
S: 2
A: 1
B: 1
S: 0
Extension of
Otway–Rees [12] ×
A: Secret key
B: Secret key
S: Secret key
5 3
A: 2
B: 2
S: 2
A: 0
B: 0
S: 0
Low PFS
protocol
Class 1
PFS
A: Password
B: Secret key
S: Private key
4 2
A: 0
B: 1
S: 2
A: 1
B: 0
S: 0
Medium PFS
protocol
Class 3
PFS
A: Password
B: Secret key
S: Private key
5 3
A: 0
B: 1
S: 2
A: 1
B: 1
S: 0
High PFS
protocol
Class 7
PFS
A: Password
B: Secret key
S: Private key
5 7
A: 0
B: 1
S: 2
A: 1
B: 1
S: 0
Notes: C1: PFS; C2: Secret used for authentication; C3: Steps; C4: Random numbers; C5: Symmetric encryption; C6: Asymmetric encryption.
perfect forward secrecy. We focus only on class-1 PFS, class-3 PFS, and class-7 PFS due to their hierarchical relations,
and propose three authentication and key distribution protocols to provide them, respectively. Of course, they all also
resist various attacks such as password guessing attacks and replay attacks.
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